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Abstract: Cooperative communications is the general idea of pooling the re-
sources of distributed nodes to improve the overall performance of a wireless 
network. In cooperative networks the nodes cooperate to help each other. A co-
operative node offering help is acting like a middle man or proxy and can convey 
messages from source to destination.  
This concept gives rise to pure wireless self-organizing networks without any 
need for base stations. It can be employed in various applications of networked 
embedded systems. Cars use it to communicate directly with each other, for in-
stance, to exchange reports on accidents, traffic jams, or bad road conditions. 
Autonomous robots may use it to build a wireless network in areas without in-
frastructure, e.g., in deserts and in space. 
1. Introduction 
IEEE 802.11 is a set of media access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifica-
tions for implementing wireless local area network (WLAN) computer communication in 
the 900 MHz and 2.4, 3.6, 5, and 60 GHz frequency bands. They are created and main-
tained by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) LAN/MAN Stand-
ards Committee (IEEE 802). 
802.11 is an emerging IEEE standard for broadband Wireless LANs (WLANs). The main 
issue addressed is sharing the wireless communication medium. The protocols used for 
sharing the medium are called coordination functions. They can be categorized into: 
• Distributed Coordinated Function (DCF) 
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o DCF with CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoid-
ance) 
o DCF with RTS/CTS (Request To Send/ Clear To Send) 
• Point Coordinated Function (PCF) 
The former two are modeled in the context of the ad-hoc mode, while the latter is mod-
eled in the infrastructure mode in the presence of AP (Access Point). DCF operates in the 
ad-hoc mode as the AP behaves like an ordinary machine, i.e., it does not do anything 
central in DCF. 
2. CHALLENGES WITH DCF 
There are many challenges associated with DCF. Here for this project sake, two are 
going to be discussed. 
1) The first attacker chose to find the goals and system for the attack. Then he 
discovers the target network and calculated all the limitations of network and 
system resources.  
2) After first phase an attacker floods company’s network or system with useless 
and malicious information [6]. 
3) Since Network and system can only handle a limited amount of traffic and an 
attacker overloads the targeted system with the unlimited amount of traffic. 
4) Denial-of-service attacks disable the computer or the network partially or 
completely depending on the nature of the enterprise [7].  
For example in authentication flood, the users send an authentication request to AP, 
AP respond with approval if there is space for approving. If the user has malicious 
intention then he can flood the AP by sending the flood of authentication request 
which causes AP to respond and hence others nodes of the network face DoS [8]. 
 
2.1.1. EXPOSED NODE PROBLEM  
In wireless networks, the exposed node problem occurs when a node is prevented from 
sending packets to other nodes because of a neighboring transmitter [2]. Consider an ex-
ample of 4 nodes labeled R1, S1, S2, and R2, where the two receivers (R1, R2) are out of 
range of each other, yet the two transmitters (S1, S2) in the middle are in range of each 




Figure 7 Exposed Terminal Problem 
Here, if a transmission between S1 and R1 is taking place, node S2 is prevented from 
transmitting to R2 as it concludes after carrier sense that it will interfere with the trans-
mission by its neighbor S1. However note that R2 could still receive the transmission of 
S2 without interference because it is out of range of S1. 
 
Figure 9 Four-way handshake with busy advertisement signals 
 
 
3. Attack Types 
1. Packet Internet or Inter-Network Groper (Ping) Flood Attack or (ICMP echo) 
2. (synchronization)SYN Flood Attack (DoS attack) 
3. DDoS Attack (Distributed SYN Flood) 
4. Land Attack (Local Area Network Denial) 
5. Authentication request flood 
6. Association request flood 
7. CTS Flood attack 
4 
 
8. RTS DoS Attack 
9. Beacon Flood 
3.1. Ping Flood Attack (ICMP echo) 
 
In Ping flood attack, the attacker focus is network bandwidth. An attempt by 
an attacker on a network focus is bandwidth, fill a network with ICMP echo 
request packets in order to slow or stop legitimate traffic going through the 










Ping is a basic net-
work program, which 
used for checking that system is alive to receive data or not. When a system receives 
the Ping message, the system must reply if it alive and active. Ping flood is also 
known as ICMP flood, To create DoS in the network, the attacker sends thousands of 
ping messages to victim node and victim node just only busy with responding that he 
is alive. At that time victim system are not able to process the other nodes infor-
mation. Victim system is even not able to receive other data in worst case scenario. 
[10] 
3.2. SYN Flood Attack 
SYN messages are exchanges when a client needs to connect to a server in TCP.  The 
user sends an SYN message, in response server send back SYN-ACK message [11]. 
In SYN flood attacker sends so many SYN requests that the system is notable for oth-
er nodes to respond. Since the server is busy with the reply to malicious SYN message 
and legitimate users are in the waiting stage. As explained in fig 3. [9] 
 




Figure 2 SYN Flood Attack 
3.3. DDoS Attack 
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) is such kind of DOS attack there are many step 
stone systems are used for generating malicious traffic and after that directed the flow 
of malicious traffic to the victim system and that cause a Denial of Service (DoS) at-
tack. As shown in fig 4 
 
Figure 3 DDoS Attack Flow of traffic 
 
 
3.4. How DDoS Attacks Work 
There are three steps to launch the DDoS attack [12]. The main goal of the attacker is 
launching a large traffic and makes that flow direction towards victim system. For 
that, he first compromised many other systems called zombies. They are compro-
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mised using Trojans, infected system with malicious software and getting control of 
that zombie system. Using zombies having many advantages for the attacker, it's be-
come impossible to block all zombies IPs addresses after detection. Each zombie gen-
erated traffic and direct that flow towards the victim. Even zombies detected attacker 
ID can't be detected.  [13] 
To handle zombies there is a controller in the second step.  This may be also a com-
promised system or a system used by attacker temporarily.  Controller, take instruc-
tion from an attacker, like how many zombies would be involved and for how much 
time, also malicious traffic format.  Even victim find the controller, attackers ID are 
still hidden from the victim. The zombies and controller are used as step stone in the 
above two phases. The third step is traffic directed towards the victim [14]. 
4. Types of DDoS Attacks 
 There are many types of DDoS attacks. Common attacks include the following: 
• Traffic attacks: In traffic attacks, the DDoS traffic is legitimate traffic like 
TCP, UDP, and ICMP. It's impossible for the victim to distinguish among ma-
licious traffic and legitimate traffic because traffic pattern is same as like legit-
imate traffic.  That’s preventing legitimate user to access the system or net-
work [15].  
• Bandwidth attacks: In that kind of attack attacker's aim is bandwidth only. 
So he fills the bandwidth with junk data. Traffic can be easily distinguished by 
victims but the amount of traffic is so much that it can't be handling [16].  
• Application attacks: In application attack, the attacker exploited the applica-
tion layer and resource unavailable for legitimate users after malicious traffic. 
Application layers distributed data to system resources.  
4.1. Land Attack (Local Area Network Denial) 
• It’s an old kind of attack. In land attack, the attackers send malicious packets 
such that it has the same source and destination address.  Both host and source 
addresses are victim addresses.  It's mostly used in local area networks. The 
victim system is lock up after getting that packets and response to itself and 




Figure 4 Land Attack (Local Area Network Denial) 
1.1.1 Authentication request flood 
• A node after listening bacon sends authentication request to AP, to associate 
itself with AP.  
• AP maintains a state table, where there is the list of authenticated nodes.   
• There are two kinds of effects of such DoS attack, First AP affected, because 
commit its normal operation and serve the request, when the request is too 
much, AP only will do the job maintaining the state table.  The second effects 
are legitimate users when state table is filled by malicious requests, there 
would be no space for accepting more legitimate requests.  State table also has 
limitations.  Shown in fig 6. 
• In that kind of attack attacker first, need to spoof the MAC of others node. So 
it's little difficult to launch if there is the proper mechanism of protection for 




Figure 5 Authentication request flood 
1.1.2  Association request flood 
• After authentication, there is association step, in association step AP associate 
a client and make the entry in the association table. But this association is also 
vulnerable to DoS.  There is de-authentication packet after authentication from 
AP if that de-authentication packet is spoofed and an attacker crack passwords 
then he can also reach to the association table. As shown in fig 7. 
• That table also has limits and if requests are beyond the limit of an associated 
table, there would defiantly a DoS attack.  
• It's harder to launch, because of the authentication step. An attacker must cross 
the authentication step [18]. 
•  




1.1.3 3.3.6 CTS Flood attack 
• IEEE 802.11 set standard for wireless networks. As we discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, first there is RTS, followed by CTS, then DATA and ACK frame. 
• Other nodes after listening CTS just update NAV and stay in quite a mood and 
start sensing media after CTS maintained time duration.   
• This behavior can be exploited by an attacker, if an attacker sends CTS to oth-
ers after the interval to others node, other nodes would be in quite a state after 
receiving.    
•  If the sending malicious CTS are back to back, no other node is able to send 
data. As shown in fig 8.  
• There is also possible that CTS sender node increase the duration and nodes 
goes in the quiet state for the extra time.[17] 
 
1.1.4 RTS DoS Attack 
• RTS frame includes Frame Control, Duration, RA, TA, and FCS. By sending 
RTS frames mentioning large transmission duration, an attacker reserves the 
wireless medium for the overdue time and forces others wireless stations shar-
ing the RF medium to delay their transmissions. As shown in fig 9.[18] 
 





Figure 8 RTS Flood 
 
1.1.5 3.3.8 Beacon Flood 
Wireless clients can detect the presence of access points by listening for the beacon 
frames transmitted from APs.  Beacon flood is launched by an attacker in such way, 
that first he generates thousands of malicious beacons around legitimate [20] AP that 
made difficult for the individual station to find the legitimate AP for the association. 
As shown in fig 10. 
 
Figure 9 Beacon Flood 
Damage & Costs 
1. Other affecting: There are many costs associated with denial-of-service at-
tacks. Like an attacker target the server, when server down, it does not only ef-




2. Bandwidth wastage: Network resources are shared among many stations. 
Like bandwidth. If attacker launches DDoS attack it does not only affect the 
target because of wastage of bandwidth and that also slow down the activity of 
non-victim systems [21].   
3. Extra network channels: To detect the attack users must use extra resources 
only to handle and prevent their system from such kind of attacks. Like email-
ing, making logs etc. 
4. Insurance& Bandwidth cost: As in international market we pay per byte. In 
DoS attack case the traffic is very high from normal traffic and that also in-
creases the bandwidth cost.   
How to handle DoS 
• Protecting: The first step should be protected in such kind of attack, protec-
tion mechanism should be installed by ISP, and there should be an agreement 
between ISP, an insurance policy. Most of the people do that after learning a 
lesson.   
• Detecting: If you detect properly then you would be able to respond accurate-
ly. For detection, there should be proper check and balance on log system, 
traffic pattern, updated blacklist and all updated detection software [28].  The 
attacker use different mechanism to launch the attack. So maybe detection not 
helps out in some kind of attacks [22].   
• Reacting: Reaction step comes when there is no proper protection and detec-
tion mechanism.  In that step there would some technical steps which are 
mostly implemented, are informing ISP,  start backup system and moving da-
ta to the backup system, decreasing the incoming traffic, applying available 
data content filters on incoming traffic, redirecting traffic, shut downing after 
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